Category Archives: Crises & Conflict

Humanitarian Intervention: PART ONE

Does it work?

Where did it come from?

After the Cold War (1947-1991) there were some serious human rights violations going on during the 1990s, like the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. This hit the world hard. Before this, people and countries worshipped ‘state sovereignty’ – which means not interfering in other countries’ affairs, and minding your own business. But with massacres happening that were killing hundreds of thousands of innocent people, the world could not longer ignore it. Suddenly, we felt obliged to help people in other nations.

What is humanitarian intervention?

This produced a pretty new idea: humanitarian intervention. Where states use military force in another country in order to protect the people against mass atrocities.

Why is it an issue?

It sounds pretty reasonable, right? The issue is this: people question whether violating state sovereignty is a good thing when many ‘humanitarian interventions’ of the past have not worked very well.

Why hasn’t it worked?

These people often look at the following: the invasion of Iraq (2003), and the intervention in Libya (2011). You’ve probably heard some crazy things about these – and they didn’t run very smoothly, to say the least. People often use these cases as evidence that humanitarian intervention simply cannot work at all.

But when you look at these cases closely, and compare it to other cases like the invasions of Kosovo and East Timor (1999), you can see that the problem is the way countries intervene – the problem isn’t intervention itself!

The ingredients you need

Before the war

  • Just cause + right intention – to intervene in a country using military force, a country must genuinely want to defend the human rights and wellbeing of the people. It won’t work if what you really want is power or wealth!
    • Firstly – there needs to be a human rights catastrophe taking place, or about to take place
    • Secondly – the country must genuinely be intervening purely to stop the problem and protect the countries’ citizens
  • Potential for success – it is dangerous and foolish to engage in military action if there is no chance of success. This would just make things worse! There needs to be a chance it’ll work.
  • Reasonable proportions – If there’s something bad going on in a country, it doesn’t necessarily mean another country can go in and wreak absolute destructive havoc that’s 10x worse.
    • Firstly, there needs to be a legitimate human rights catastrophe taking place or about to take place.
    • Secondly, the response taken needs to be proportional to the situation. You can’t go in with the weaponry and force to obliterate the entire country, its people, its nature….
  •  Last resort – we can all agree that peace is better. Countries should try to prevent human rights disasters + solve them as peacefully as possible before heading in with military.

During the war

  • Justified actions and conduct – the principles above need to be present in all major acts of war. e.g. there may be just cause invade and target rebels, however there might not be just cause to overthrow an entire regime straight out.
  • Assessment and sensitivity – strategy and actions in war aren’t black and white. They must take into consideration the different culture and nature of the nation they are in, to ensure successful protection instead of just imposing their own idea of protection!

After the war

  • Peace building – if you want to prevent destruction and conflict in the future, you can’t abandon a country in tatters. You need to help rebuild & recover to prevent future catastrophes.

Putting it into practice

Country What worked? What didn’t work? What this means
Kosovo 1999 Just cause. There was an impending humanitarian catastrophe against the separatist movement that was building – looking to shape up to the atrocities of Srebrenica and Rwanda Probability of success. It is pointed out that that the intervention did not adequately consider the geopolitical relations of the major powers. Many of the actions taken were therefore ineffective and inconsistent. Highlights the importance of assessing the specific circumstances of the situation and the specific actions taken during intervention. Even with just cause, military intervention is messy and complicated – you need to think carefully about your actions.
East Timor 1999 Just cause. The Indonesia-backed militia had begun avaging the country of East Timor who voted in favour of indeendence. Within a few days, est. 1,000 died. The UN Security Council authorized force given the mass scale of the catastrophe.Conduct of war. The Australian forces in East Timor that intervened did not do things that weren’t legally and morally justified.Peacebuilding. After the war was officially over, Australian forces remained to help East Timor transition to independence and rebuild the new, independent state. This illustrates that while humanitarian intervention may be morally justified, all the actions taken during intervention must also be morally justified + forces must help to rebuild countries – two elements required for any success of peace and human rights.
Iraq 2003 No just cause or right intention. Disproportionate Response. Since the war, the United States has justified their intervention on the basis that Iraqi citizens needed to be protected against weapons of mass destruction and an unstable Middle East. But they had no evidence that such weapons existed. And compared to the events of Rwanda, there were no human rights violations of this scale occurring. Therefore, many argue that the United States was just trying to grow its own power! Humanitarian intervention is only ‘humanitarian’ if the forces are genuinely trying to protect human rights. If they aren’t aiming for this, it’s very unlikely they will achieve this!Further, responding with military force is serious – and therefore can’t be used for smaller-scale issues that should be addressed in other ways
Libya 2011 Just cause. There were indeed a serious human rights catastrophe impending. Muammer Gaddafi announced that his army was ready to ‘’cleanse’ the city of Benghazi with ‘no mercy’ and at this state est. 1,000-10,000 people had been killed. The UN Security Council therefore authorized military intervention – under Resolution 1973. Unjustified conduct. The forces could initially justify the military intervention by legal and moral principles. However they couldn’t morally justify the complete change of state regime that they eventually instigated. Many argue that the way they left the just principles of humanitarian intervention is the reason why they were never able to properly defend the human rights of the Libyan people. Military intervention may be morally justified to begin with, but the actions taken by the interveners also need to be justified by the principles explained above. Many people now look at the case of LIbya and think military intervention with humanitarian goals isn’t possible. But we need to remember why it didn’t work!

Conclusion

It’s easy to look at the past and feel pessimistic – can we ever defend human rights?

But we’re suggesting this: let’s look at the reasons we’ve had these setbacks in the past, and let them guide us to greater success in defending human rights in the future! Let’s not just believe all the cynics and self-interested leaders. Let’s challenge them!

Eleanor Scott.

Sources

Books

Evans, Gareth. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.

Orford, Anna. Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Weiss, Thomas G. ‘Humanitarian Intervention.’ In An Introduction to International Relations, edited by Richard Devetak, 426-429. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Government sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses. United Kingdom, 2003.

Journal Articles

Eliens, Marco. ‘Review: Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo. Iraq, Darfur, and the Record of Global Civil Society.’ Amsterdam Law Forum 1, no. 2 (2009): 101-104.

Johnson, James Turner. ‘Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq: Just War and International Law Perspectives.’ Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 2 (2006): 115-116, doi: 10.1080/15027570600707706.

Pattison, James. ‘The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya.’ Ethics and International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011): 271-273.

Wheeler, Nicholas and Dunne, Tim. ‘East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism.’ International Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001): 805-827.

Wheeler, Nicholas. ‘Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: emergent norm, moral duty or the coming anarchy?’ International Affairs 77, no. 1 (2001): 113-128.

News Sources

Greenlees, Don, and Garran, Robert. ‘Marching into tragedy.’ The Australian, 8 September, 1999.

News Middle East. ‘Iraq War in Figures.’ BBC, 14 December, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11107739

Tripoli. ‘Gaddafi tells Benghazi his army is coming tonight.’ Al Arabiya News, 17 March, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/2011317645549498.html.

Websites

‘East Timor peacekeeping mission to conclude.’ Army.gov.au. Accessed 21 September, 2014. http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/News-and-media/News-and-media-2012/News-and-media-December-2012/East-Timor-peacekeeping-mission-to-conclude.

Death and Destruction in Northern Nigeria

NED JACKSON

The January 3rd attack on the cities of Baga and Doron Baga by terrorist organisation Boko Haram has illustrated Nigeria’s precarious security position. While estimates of casualties range from hundreds to thousands, Amnesty International has described the assault as “devastation of catastrophic proportions”. They also suggest that this indicates a dangerous escalation from the militant group whom they allege are already responsible for over 4,000 civilian deaths in 2014 (Amnesty, Press Release, Jan 15 2015).

graph

In the aftermath of such an atrocity, it is useful to explore the motivations and actions of the Nigerian Islamist group and the mixture of corruption, instability and disunity that allow them to thrive.

boko haram 5

Motivations:
Boko Haram translates roughly to ‘western education is forbidden’, yet their official name Jamā‘atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da‘wati wal-Jihād more aptly alludes to their Islamist nature as the ‘People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad’ (U.S. State Department, 2013).

Similarly, the razing of Baga and Doron Baga were described by Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau as “such a killing as he (God) commanded us in his book” (The Age, ‘Boko Haram leader…’ Jan 22, 2015). Their objections to Western education, democracy and the Nigerian government are premised in the gender mixing, scientific theories and leadership that they feel irreconcilably conflicts with the teachings of Islam (SalafiManhaj, 2013, 17).

On the other hand, former Nigerian general Muhammadu Buhari, has declared Boko Haram “mindless bigots masquerading as Muslims” and suggested their motives stem more from self-aggrandisement and power relations.

Funding:
The group is financed largely through kidnapping, bank robberies and wealthy donors. It has been suggested these donations may have been received in large part from their Islamist allies al-Qaida, or funnelled from subversive individuals within the Nigerian government (SalafiManhaj, 2013, 23).

Chibrook kidnapping:

South Africa Nigeria Kidnapped Girls

The group attracted international notoriety following its kidnapping and enslavement of 276 female students, due largely to the subsequent #bringbackourgirls campaign, championed by U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama. Despite an intense level of media exposure, as of 24 January 2015 the release of the girls had not been successfully negotiated.

The kidnapping further emphasised the inability of Nigerian security services to combat this threat as they had received warning of the attack four hours beforehand, but they have insisted their resources were already over stretched (ABC News, May 9, 2014).

A case for intervention or containment?

nigeria army

The sheer brutality demonstrated by Boko Haram is difficult to deny, but the debate inevitably turns to the most effective way to ensure their defeat. Following their declaration of an Islamic caliphate, historian David Motadel has urged a policy of containment, predicting their inability to govern will lead to an inevitable collapse (NY Times, 2014).

One problem is the lack of a cohesive formal government to support in Nigeria, with human rights organisations alleging military and paramilitary forces conduct extra judicial killings and other abuses that may represent crimes against humanity (HR Watch, 2012).

Except in the case of the highly publicised Chibrook kidnapping, international support has not been forthcoming as until recently it has been largely perceived as Nigeria’s internal domestic situation. However, concerned neighbouring states such as Chad, Cameroon and Niger have formed an African Coalition force of 3,500 troops in order to fight the threat Boko Haram poses (Foxnews, 2014). Nonetheless, the absence of a truly global response contrasts sharply with the recent international eagerness to intervene against the Iraqi/Syrian group known as Da’ish (AKA Islamic State).

Sources:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/nigeria-satellite-images-show-horrific-scale-boko-haram-attack-baga-2015-01
http://www.theage.com.au/world/boko-haram-leader-abubakar-shekau-claims-massacre-was-a-command-from-god-20150122-12vdos.html?skin=text-only
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm

Click to access SalafiManhaj_BokoHaram.pdf

http://abcnews.go.com/International/nigeria-hour-warning-school-raid-amnesty-international/story?id=23652165

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/01/cameroon-minister-5-nation-military-force-against-boko-haram-to-be-operational/

Israel-Gaza conflict and issues of security

KIM NGUYEN

It is concerning to discover that issues of national interest and warfare continue to be prioritised over the security of the citizens in Gaza. While bloodshed and violence remain rampant in the city, more than 340 civilians have been killed as a result of two nations, Israel and Palestine fighting over a strip of land that should be recognised as being part of the territory of Palestine, an independent nation. The conflict has occurred over several decades as it begun in the mid-20th century. Currently, the beleaguerment of Gaza by Israel in conjunction with the reign of the Hamas, a well- known Islamic terrorist group has resulted in over 1.5 million Palestinians struggling to have a decent lifestyle. Poverty, high rates of unemployment as well as Israel’s regulating of key trade routes has not only been detrimental to the economy but even more notably, has prevented the people from rising beyond their difficult circumstances and working towards rebuilding their city (BBC: Newsround 2014).

The Israel-Gaza conflict is a display of the traditional view of security “realism” which continues to dominate global politics and thus, influences the conduct of nations’ leaders in the international stage. Over the years, the development of alternative views of security such as human security and the feminist view has helped to divert attention from the activities between “warfare states” and consequently, create a greater emphasis on the security and wellbeing of the individual and their community. Viewing security through these “lens” humanises the nature of war and violence by highlighting the drastic consequences inflicted upon civilians when war is waged as a “weapon” amongst states.

According to UNICEF, the UN children’s agency, the Israel-Gaza conflict has resulted in more children being killed than militants with 73 of the victims comprising of those under-aged. Additionally, over 50,000 Gazans have fled to seek sanctuary at UN institutions, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). While the withdrawal of the Israelis troops would be most optimal; in order to achieve stability in the region, a multi-dimensional view of security should be adopted. This entails the fulfilment of “ordinary daily needs”; whether it be economic, health, social, psychological and sexual (Jonsson 2008, p 25). It is not just “the absence of war but also requires that people have food and shelter, are healthy, educated..” (Tickner 1992).

This view evaluates the role of states as being the “adequate security providers” for their citizens in terms of its internal political and social institutions. In the case of Israel-Gaza conflict, it is essential for Israel to depart from its militant position as a “warfare state actor” by not impeding on the sovereignty of other nations through invasions and domination. Instead, a position as the “security provider” should be adopted by directing resources towards resolving issues of domestic and personal security. Until poverty, violence and discrimination is eliminated, the security of the state as whole as well as specifically, its civilians is never “truly secure”.